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8 April 1960

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
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

8 April 1960

DAILY BRIEF

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

II. ASIA-AFRICA

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South Africa: International criticism of South Africa is increasing, particularly in other African states, where there is a growing movement to boycott South African goods. The Afro-Asian bloc in the United Nations reportedly plans to move for a second Security Council session on South Africa if Hammarskjold fails in his efforts to bring about a modification of the Union's racial policies. The majority of the white South African population has virtually ignored outside criticism and is stubbornly confident that the natives can be permanently cowed.

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Belgian Congo: Top officials in Brussels have told the US Embassy that there will be "economic and political turmoil" in the Congo if outside assistance of up to \$135 million does not become available before the Congolese achieve independence on 30 June. Brussels' urgent plea to the United States for help suggests that the Belgians have been slow in realizing the economic implications of the Congo's transition to independence. The flight of capital from the territory since the January announcement on independence, apparently out of fear of expropriation, has been extensive. Some European civil employees have begun to leave.

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British Somaliland: Colonial officials in the protectorate have dropped their plan to reject outright the local demands for independence by 1 July and an early association with Somalia. London wants to stall independence but is concerned that complete

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denial now of the Somali demands might lead to violence in the protectorate. The British commander of local security forces cannot guarantee the loyalty of his Somali personnel. Britain plans to give the Somalis some latitude by offering to "consult," in the hope that moderation will prevail. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Indonesia: Non-Communist political and army elements are continuing to plot moves against Sukarno during his absence. It is doubtful, however, that Army Chief Nasution will bring himself to the point of trying to oust Sukarno at present, since he probably fears that he would not be able to consolidate enough strength to retain power. There is still an outside chance that Nasution or others may decide to act. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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Laos: Communist propaganda continues to accuse the government of planning to rig the elections to be held on 24 April and warns that an "extremely dangerous situation" will be created in Laos if "reactionaries" win a majority of the 59 seats. The pro-Communist Neo Lao Hak Sat party and fellow-traveling Santiphab party are putting up nine candidates each; additional sympathizers may be hidden among independent candidates.

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[REDACTED]

III. THE WEST

Cuba: The Communists are making a determined effort to take complete control of the Cuban Labor Confederation before the massive labor rally planned for May Day. Their move is gaining momentum with support from the minister of labor, who has Fidel Castro's endorsement. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Increasing International Criticism of South Africa

International criticism of the Union of South Africa is increasing, particularly in Africa and Asia, and some African nations are threatening to take direct economic and political action. The Nigerian parliament has passed a motion urging a ban on the importation of South African goods; similar action is being considered by nongovernmental groups elsewhere in Africa. The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions has announced a two-month consumer boycott beginning in May.

Prime Minister Nkrumah of Ghana, opening the three-day "positive action" conference of African nations in Accra on 7 April, called recent events in the Union "a signpost to the beginning of the end of foreign supremacy" in Africa. Moderate Tanganyikan leader Julius Nyerere has sent telegrams to Nkrumah and Indian Prime Minister Nehru urging them to stay away from the forthcoming Commonwealth prime ministers' conference unless the South African prime minister is "excluded." In Britain, the Committee of African Organizations, a Communist-infiltrated group which coordinates the activities of many African organizations in London, has invited all Commonwealth prime ministers at their meeting in London next month to expel South Africa from the Commonwealth. The Afro-Asian bloc in the United Nations reportedly plans to move for a second Security Council session on South Africa if Secretary General Hammarskjold fails in his efforts to moderate the Union's racial policies.

According to the American Embassy in Cape Town, although recent events have shaken some South African leaders,

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the majority of the white population is blind to the significance of the disturbances. External criticism, including the Security Council resolution of 1 April, is virtually ignored by both the politicians and the press. Although business and industrial leaders have stepped up their appeals for a change in government policy, the embassy believes that most white South Africans are stubbornly confident that the natives can be permanently cowed. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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Belgians Express Alarm Over Congo's Situation

Top Belgian officials have told the US Embassy in Brussels that there will be "economic and political turmoil" in the Congo if measures are not taken immediately to head off an impending economic and financial crisis. In separate conversations with embassy officers on 5 April, both Congo Minister de Schrijver and his economic counselor insisted that the future of the country can be secure only if outside financial assistance of \$120-135 million is obtained even before the Congo achieves full independence on 30 June. Failing this, they foresee stagnation of the Congolese economy, a serious aggravation of the already difficult unemployment problem, and a resulting refusal of the Congolese to cooperate with Brussels.

The flight of Belgian capital from the Congo since independence was agreed upon last January is probably the most immediate of the major problems confronting the Belgian Government. Although exchange controls were recently initiated, the Congo central bank's reserves reportedly have fallen sharply, and there are apparently insufficient funds in sight to meet treasury requirements between now and 30 June. The longer term problem, according to the Belgians, is the lack of funds--over and above a \$54,000,000 Belgian contribution--to finance the Congo's 1960 "extraordinary" or investment budget. Belgian attempts to obtain aid from the French, Swiss, Germans, and the European Common Market's investment bank are said to have been unsuccessful, despite the Belgian Government's willingness to guarantee all loans made to the Congo.

Brussels' urgent plea for US assistance suggests that the Belgians have been slow to realize the economic implications of the Congo's transition to independence, and they may be increasingly nervous over the Belgian-Congolese economic conference scheduled for 25 April. This conference is supposed to decide such issues as commercial policy, Belgian economic assistance to the Congo, the extent of public and private investments, and the Congo's future relations with the European Common Market.

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British Somaliland

Colonial officials in British Somaliland have dropped their plan to reject outright the demands of the protectorate's newly elected legislature for independence by 1 July and for an early association with Somalia. Somalia, a UN trust territory which has been under Italian tutelage for nearly ten years, is to achieve independence on that date.

Although London hopes to dampen the growing enthusiasm among the inexperienced protectorate leaders for immediate independence, it is fearful that complete denial of demands in British Somaliland at this time might lead to serious disturbances in the country. Furthermore, British officials are concerned over a report by the British commander of local security that the loyalty of his Somali personnel is uncertain; therefore they plan to "give the Somalis their head or at least a very loose rein" in the hope that moderation will ultimately prevail. The protectorate's governor will inform the local Somalis that he is ready to begin discussing the problems of independence.

London, in addition, will attempt to placate Ethiopia's traditional suspicion that the UK fosters the creation of a Greater Somalia--which would include nearly one third of Ethiopia's territory--by issuing an early denial in Parliament. Addis Ababa, however, has been further annoyed by refusal of local Somali officials in the protectorate to permit the establishment of an Ethiopian consulate in Hargeisa, the capital. [REDACTED]

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Anti-Sukarno Plotting Continues in Indonesia

Political maneuvering and plotting in Indonesia, which were encouraged by President Sukarno's appointment of a new Parliament on 27 March, have continued since he left on 1 April for a two-month global tour. The scope of the alleged plots varies from merely preventing the installation of Parliament to overthrowing Sukarno.

All anti-Sukarno plotters agree that army support or leadership is essential. The army's position, in turn, reportedly depends partially on the outcome of the current dispute in the Nahdatul Ulama (NU), one of Indonesia's two major Moslem parties. The dispute centers on whether the NU should participate in the new Parliament when it is installed in June or support a recently formed anti-Sukarno political coalition, the Democratic League. Anti-Parliament elements in the NU claim they are gaining strength and may win control of the party. The American Embassy in Djakarta believes that if these elements can induce the party to support the Democratic League, this change would exert pressure on the army for action.

Despite unofficial support of the Democratic League, the Indonesian Army leadership continues to give little indication that it plans a takeover during Sukarno's absence. The army's attitude presumably is influenced by the lack of unity in the army itself, as well as by the improbability that anti-Sukarno political forces would hold together under stress.

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Laotian Election Campaign

Communist propaganda continues to accuse the Laotian Government of rigging the elections to be held on 24 April and warns that an "extremely dangerous situation" will be created in Laos if "reactionaries" win a majority of the 59 National Assembly seats. The Communists are probably referring primarily to candidates sponsored by the reformist Committee for Defense of National Interests (CDNI) and possibly to those elements of former Premier Phoui's Rally of the Lao People (RLP) considered by the Communists to be hopelessly committed to the "American imperialists."

The Communist-front Neo Lao Hak Sat (NLHS) and the fellow-traveling Santiphab party are putting up nine candidates each; there may be additional sympathizers among the independent candidates. The Communists can probably hope at best to elect only a small leftist bloc, but they may expect the non-Communist majority to break up into contending groups when the new assembly convenes. The present Communist propaganda line, by concentrating its criticism on the CDNI, seems designed in part to bring about such fragmentation or, failing this, to build up a case for withdrawing from legitimate political operations in Laos and relying essentially on a Pathet Lao guerrilla campaign to gain control of the country.

King Savang has undertaken an extensive tour of the northern provinces which he hopes will benefit the government-approved candidates. The RLP and the CDNI continue their cooperation by withdrawing all but one progovernment candidate in most districts where there is leftist opposition, but there are already indications that this collaboration may not last beyond election day. [REDACTED]

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III. THE WEST

Communist Tactics in the Cuban Labor Movement

Communists are making a determined effort to take complete control of the Cuban Labor Confederation, where they already have substantial influence in the national directorate and in several constituent federations. Labor Minister Martinez Sanchez has cooperated with them and, when CTC President David Salvador complained of this, Martinez' action was endorsed by Fidel Castro, who said the labor problems could be "solved calmly" after May Day.

The Cuban Communist party (PSP) is [] planning to discredit Salvador by criticizing his role in preparing for a mammoth May Day rally ordered by Castro. It claims he has hung back while PSP leaders are organizing "a million workers, civil militias, and the armed forces" to demonstrate support for the regime.

The CTC, well organized and totaling half a million members, was dominated by Communists with the consent of Batista when he was president in the early 1940s. Labor leaders who oppose them now include many leftists like Salvador, as well as Catholics, original 26th of July members, and others who are familiar with Communist tactics under the guise of "unity."

PSP leaders claim that Salvador and other non-Communist CTC national officials know they will soon be dislodged and that they hope to take asylum, claiming persecution by the Castro government and the Communist party. Although Salvador was Castro's choice to run the CTC as the labor arm of the regime, rumors that he will be replaced have arisen from his opposition to the purging of some 20 non-Communist CTC leaders by CTC organizational secretary Jesus Soto and others believed to be manipulated by Raul Castro. []

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